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Plaintiffs

and

Appellants

Stephen

E.

Brendle

and

Richard L. Maires (collectively referred to herein as "Lot
Owners" or "Owners") hereby submit, pursuant to Rules 24 and 2 6
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, their opening brief
with

respect

to the district

court's Ruling

and Order

upholding the decision of the Draper City Council to prohibit
Owners from constructing a home on a lot they own in Draper
and the trial court's dismissal of Owner's other claims
pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant City of
Draper (hereinafter "Draper.")
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS
This is an appeal of right taken from a final Ruling
and Order entered after a ron-jury trial and from the district
court's ruling on Draper's Motion to Dismiss.

No post-

judgment motions were filed by either party. The final Ruling
and Order appealed from was entered on November 27, 1995.
Owners filed a timely Notice of Appeal on December 22, 1995.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) has been "poured
over" to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL
1.

Did the Draper City Council lack jurisdiction to

review the earlier approval by the Draper City Planning
Commission of Owners' construction of a home on their Lot
after the expiration of the statutory period for appeal from

1

the planning commission's decision to allow construction to
proceed?
(a)

Standard of review: Whether the expiration of

an appeals period deprives a decision making entity

from

jurisdiction to further consider a mater is a conclusion of
law.

[cite], as such the trial court's decision is reviewed

for correctness.

United Park City Mines CQt vf Greater Park

City CQt, 870 p.2d 880, 885 (ut-h 1993); Kasco Services Corpt
v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1993).
(b)

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 37-39; 84-

85]
2.
had

not

Did the trial court err in determining that Owners
obtained

a

vested

right

to

proceed

with

the

construction of a home on their lot after the Appellants had
obtained a valid building permit and secured approval from the
Draper City Planning Commission and the time for all appeals
from said decision had expired?
(a)

Standard of review: The trial court ruled, as

a conclusion of law, that Owners had not obtained a vested
right to proceed with development of their Lot.

See [R. at

224]. Such conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness..
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co. r 870 P.2d
880, 885 (Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d
86, 89 (Utah 1993) .

2

(b)

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 12-13, 39-

40, 224].
3.

Is Draper equitably estopped from halting Owner's

use and enjoyment of their property by Appellants' detrimental
reliance on the permission to proceed with construction that
was granted by the Draper City Planning Commission, in that
Owners have, on the basis of a validly issued building permit,
began construction, including the excavation and pouring of a
foundation for their home, at great expense to Owners?
(a)

Standard of review: The trial court ruled, as

a conclusion of law, that Draper was not equitably estopped
from

enforcing

its

zoning

construction on their Lot,

ordinances

See

to

stop

Owners'

[R. at 224]. This conclusion

of law is reviewed for correctness..

United Park City Mines

Co. v. Greater Park City Co.f 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993);

Kasco Services Corpt Vt Benson, 831 p.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1993).
(b)

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 13-14, 39-

Did

the

40, 224].
4.

trial

court

err

in dismissing

Owners1

constitutional claims for uncompensated takings under the Utah
and

federal

constitutions,

their

claims

under

Utah's

declaratory relief act, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for denial
of equal protection of the laws?
(a)

Standard of review:

Whether the dismissal of

a claim pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper is a
3

conclusion of law.

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St, Benedict's

Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Hansen v. Dept. of
Fillf Institutions/ 858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah App. 1993).
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness..

Such

United Park

City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co. f 870 P.2d 880, 885
(Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89
(Utah 1993) .

(b)
5.

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 127-32].

Was the decision of the Draper City Council to

reverse the earlier decision of the Draper City

Planning

Commission to allow Owners to proceed with construction on
their lot arbitrary, capricious or illegal in light of its
failure to address the appropriate factors specified by the
Draper City f s Hillside Ordinance?
(a)

standard of review: The Court of Appeals, in

reviewing the trial court's review of the zoning decisions of
Draper "owes no particular deference to the trial court's
review of a particular agency action."

Technomedical Labsf

Inc. v. Utah Securities Div.t 744 P.2d 320 (Ut. App. 1987).
To the extent the trial court's decision is based upon the
testimony of witnesses, the court of appeals must defer to the
trial court's advantaged position to hear, weigh and evaluate
the testimony of the parties.

Davis County v. Clearfield

Cityr 756 P.2d 704 (Ut. App. 1988).

(b)

Issue preserved fpr appeal: [R. at 40-41; 357].
4

6.

Was the decision of the Draper City Council to

reverse the earlier decision of the Draper City Planning
Commission based on "public clamor" rather than a consideration
of the appropriate decision-making factors.
(a)

Standard Of review: The Court of Appeals, in

reviewing the trial court's review of the zoning decisions of
Draper "owes no particular deference to the trial court's
review of a particular agency action."

Technomedical Labs,

Inct Vt Utah Securities DiVt, 744 p.2d 320 (ut. App. 1987).
To the extent the trial court's decision is based upon the
testimony of witnesses, the court of appeals must defer to the
trial court's advantaged position to hear, weigh and evaluate
the testimony of the parties.

Davis County v. Clearfield

City, 756 P.2d 704 (Ut. App. 1988).

(b)
7.
finding

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 358-59].

Did the trial court err, in light of its express
that the Draper City Planning

Commission

granted

permission to Appellants to proceed with construction on the
basis of a mutual mistake of fact (with no bad faith or deceit
on the part of Appellants) in determining that Draper had the
authority and right to reconsider the planning commission's
earlier action and that Owners therefore did not obtain a
vested right to proceed with the construction of their home
and Draper was not therefore equitably estopped from halting
Owners' construction of the home?
5

(a)

Standard of review:

The trial court ruled, as

a finding of fact that there had been a mutual mistake of fact
regarding

the

lack

of

opposition

Owners1

to

continued

development of their Lot and that the decision of the Draper
Planning Commission to allow such construction was based on
that mutual mistake (which came about without any bad faith on
the part of Owners.)

See [R at 223-24].

findings of fact, the trial court, held
law,

that

Draper

could

re-open

the

Based on those
as conclusions of

decision

after

the

expiration of the appeals period, that Owners had not acquired
vested rights to proceed with construction and that Draper was
not equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances to
stop Owners 1 construction on their Lot.
These

conclusions

of

law

are

reviewed

See [R. at 224].
for

correctness..

United Park City Mines Cot yf Greater Park City CQ t , 870 P.2d
880, 885 (Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d
86, 89 (Utah 1993).
(b)

Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 360-62].
STATEMENT OP THE CASE

This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court
upholding the decision of the Draper City Council to stop
construction of a residence on a subdivision lot owned by
Owners after Owners had previously obtained a building permit
and commenced
Draper's

construction of a home on the lot.

untimely

reversal

of
6

its

previously

After
granted

authorization to Owners to proceed with construction on their
lot, Owners commenced this judicial action asserting that:
Draper lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier action;
that Owners had acquired a "vested right" to proceed with the
construction of their home; that Draper was equitably estopped
to prevent Owners1 completion of the home they had commenced
building on the basis of reasonable reliance on Draper's
earlier decision; that the issuance of the "stop work" Order
by Draper was arbitrary, capricious and illegal; and that
Draper's actions violated Owners' constitutional rights under
the "takings/ "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of
the United States and Utah Constitutions.
The trial court issued a ruling in response to Draper's
Motion to Dismiss that Owners' Complaint would be treated as
a "Petition for Review" and that the Court would therefore
conduct an "appellate" review of Draper's actions. This ruling
implicitly dismissed Owners' constitutional claims and limited
the scope of Owners' rights at the evidentiary hearing. After
taking evidence, the trial court issued a written Ruling and
Order

in which

it held that Draper's actions were not

arbitrary or capricious, that Draper had jurisdiction to
revoke the prior authorization granted to Owners, that Owners
had

not

obtained

a

vested

right

to

proceed

with

the

development on their lot and that Draper was not equitably
estopped from halting Owners' building on their lot. Owners
7

filed this timely appeal from the trial court1s final Ruling
and Order.
STATEMENT OP FACTS
1.

In April

1994, Owners

entered

into

an Option

Agreement to purchase Lot 304 in the Cove at Bear Canyon (the
"Lot"). Ex. 1,[R. at 250-51].
2.

The Lot is sloped and bordered on the upper (east)

and lower (west) sides by streets in a platted subdivision.
As originally platted, the Lot was intended to have a home
constructed on the west end of the Lot facing the lower
street.
3.

[R. at 252-53].
In constructing the lower street, however, the

subdivision's developers made "cuts1' into the lower end of the
Lot that made the lower end impossibly steep and, as a
practical matter, unbuildable.
4.

Because

of

these

[R. at 252].
discrepancies

between

the

subdivision plat and the actually constructed subdivision,
Owners

made

their

purchase of

the Lot

contingent

upon

receiving approval from Draper to locate a home on the upper
end of the lot, facing east. Ex. 1; [R. at 251-52].
5»

After an on-site inspection by the Draper City

engineer, who "concurred" with Uie relocation of the home to
the east end of the Lot, Owners obtained a building permit and
authorization from Draper's planning and zoning commission to

8

proceed with construction on the east end of the Lot.

[R. at

253]; Exs. 3 and 4.
6.

In reliance on the building permit and permission to

proceed with construction, Owners exercised the option and
purchased the Lot for $61,000.
7.

On April 27, 1994, Owners commenced construction of

a luxury home on the Lot.
8.

[R. at 262].

Ex. 12.

In June 1994, however, Draper received complaints

from owners of lots located on the eastern street (although
not contiguous to, or even in sight of the Lot) that Owners'
home might obstruct their views, and Draper City issued a
"Stop Work" Order.
9.

[R. at 270-71].

At a hearing before the Draper Planning Commission,

on June 13, 1994, the issuance of the "Stop Work" Order, was
upheld.

The basis for this decision was ostensibly the Draper

Hillside Ordinance, which prohibited construction on slopes in
excess of 30%.

The opposing testimony presented at the

hearing, however, focused on the views of the neighboring
landowners and the amounts they had paid for their lots as
opposed to the price paid by Owners.
10.

[R. at 270-72].

On August 23, 1994 Owners appealed the planning

commission's decision to the Draper City Council. Once again
certain neighbors objected on the grounds that their views
might be obstructed.

[R. at 74].

9

11.

Having exhausted their administrative remedies,

Owners filed a Petition for Review in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 94 09059588A, on
September 21, 1994.

In a Ruling and Order dated April 18,

1995, the District Court determined that the actions of the
Planning Commission and the City Council were not arbitrary
and capricious.
12.

[R. at 74-75].

Following

the

District

Court's

ruling,

Owners

contacted the developer for the subdivision containing their
Lot to discuss "trading" for another lot or obtaining a refund
on their purchase of the "unbuildable" Lot.
13.

[R. at 272].

The developer informed Owners that he believed that

with his assistance they could obtain approval from Draper to
proceed with the construction of the house on the east end of
the Lot.
14.

[R. at 273-74]; Ex. 9A.
Prior to the expiration of the period for appealing

the District Court's determination, Plaintiffs asked the
Planning Commission to reconsider its previous decision.
9A.

Ex.

After considering all of the factors relevant under the

Hillside Ordinance, the Planning Commission voted on April 20,
1995, to allow Owners to proceed with the construction of the
home on the east end of the Lot.
15.

Under

section

Ex. 10A.

6-1-4(B)

of

the

Land

Use

and

Development Regulations of Draper City, an appeal from a
decision of the Planning Commission "shall be filed in writing
10

with the City Recorder within fourteen
Planning Commission's decision ... . M
16.

(14) days of the

Ex. 11.

No written appeal of the decision to allow Owners to

proceed with construction on the Lot was filed with the Draper
City Recorder within the fourteen-day period.
17.

[R. at 284].

In reliance on the April 20, 1995, decision of the

Planning Commission and after expiration of the period for
appeal, Owners incurred expenses in excess of $50,000 in
pouring the foundation for the home on the east end of the
Lot. [R. at 289].
18.

On or about June 1, 1995, however, Owners learned

that a property owner on the eastern street had asked the
Draper Planning Commission to reconsider its decision, despite
the fact that Owners had poured their foundation and the
period for appeal had expired.

These objecting parties

asserted that they had not received notice of the April 20,
1995 decision of the Draper Planning Commission.

Ex. 13, [R.

at 291].
19.

Notwithstanding

Plaintiffs1

objection

that

the

planning commission lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its
earlier decision after the expiration of the appeals period,
the Draper Planning Commission reheard the matter on June 8,
1995.

On that date, the Planning Commission again voted to

allow its earlier decision to allow building on the east end
of the Lot to proceed.

Ex. 10B.
11

20.

An appeal was sought with the Draper City Council on

June 9, 1995, and Owners again objected that Draper lacked
jurisdiction to change the April 20 decision of the Planning
Commission.

Despite these objections, the City Council

reversed the Planning Commission's decision to allow Owners to
proceed with construction on the east end of their Lot. Ex.
IOC.
21.
address

In reaching this decision, the Council failed to
the

Ordinance,

relevant
basing

its

issues

relevant

decision

to

instead

the
on

Hillside
irrelevant

considerations such as the potential obstruction of neighbors1
views and the relative prices paid for surrounding lots. Jd.
22.

On June 14, 1995, Draper City issued a "Stop Work"

Order to Owners. Owners then filed this action in order to
seek a conclusive judicial determination that Draper's "Stop
Work" Order was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, that it
violated Owners' vested property right to proceed with the
development of their property, that Draper lacked jurisdiction
to issue the "Stop Work" Order after the expiration of the
appeals period for the April 20, 1995 planning commission
decision, that Draper was equitably estopped from halting
Owners' construction efforts and that issuance of the "Stop
Work" Order under these circumstances was a violation of
Plaintiffs' constitutional rights protected by the Takings,

12

Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
and Utah Constitutions.
23.

[R. at 298-99].

Draper filed a Motion to Dismiss in which it argued

that Owners1 Complaint must be construed as a "Petition for
Review" under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and that the trial
court was therefore limited to determining whether Draper's
land use decisions were "arbitrary, capricious or illegal."
[R. at 72-79].
24.

In a "Ruling" issued on September 27, 1995, the trial

court held that "the Complaint should be treated as a "Petition
for Review."

[R. at 211-13].

Accordingly, Owners were

limited in the scope of evidence they were allowed to present
at trial and were not allowed to put on evidence relating to
their constitutional claims. X3.
25.

The trial court issued a final "Ruling and Order" on

November 27, 1995, after having heard evidence at a one-day
trial on October 12, 1995. In that Ruling and Order the Court
found Draper's decision to stop the Owners' construction on
their Lot was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The Court
further held that there were no jurisdictional problems and
that Owners had not obtained a "vested right" to proceed with
construction and that Draper was not equitably estopped from
halting Owners' construction on the Lot.
26.

Owners

December 22, 1995.

filed

a

timely

[R. at 226-27].
13

[R. at 222-25].

Notice

of

Appeal

on

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
1.

The Draper Planning Commission voted 5-1 on April

20, 1995 to allow Owners to proceed with construction of their
home on the upper end of their Lot. The relaxant Draper Land
Use

Regulations

require

a

written

appeal

of

planning

commission decisions to be filed with the City Recorder within
fourteen days.

No written appeal of the planning commission's

decision was filed.

After the expiration of the appeals

period, Owners proceeded, at very substantial expense, to pour
foundations for a luxury home at the upper end of their Lot.
The Draper Planning Commission and City Council re-opened and
reconsidered the permission granted on April 20, 1995 at
meetings held on June 3 and June 13, 1995.

Draper lacked

jurisdiction, due to the expiration of the applicable appeals
period, to re-open the issue.
2.

By obtaining a building permit and permission from

the Draper Planning Commission to build in an area in excess
of 3 0% slope and by proceeding (after the expiration of all
relaxant appeals periods) with construction on their home,
Owners obtained a "vested right" to proceed with construction
under the rule announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Western
Land Equities, Inc. v. Citv of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah
1980).
3.

Draper

is equitably

estopped

from

halting

the

Owners' construction of a home on their Lot after they had
14

reasonably and in good faith relied, to their substantial
detriment, on the April 20, 1995 decision of the Draper
Planning Commission by expending in excess of $50,000 in
pouring foundations at the upper end of their Lot.
4.

Owners properly stated claims for relief, sufficient

to withstand Draper's Motion to Dismiss, for the uncompensated
taking of their property, for denial of equal protection, for
declaratory and injunctive relief and for denial of their
civil

rights, which

claims

the

trial

court

improperly

dismissed without opportunity for plenary consideration.
5.

The Draper City Council failed to consider the

appropriate statutory factors in reaching its decision to
overturn the previously

issued permission for Owners to

proceed with construction on the upper end of their Lot.
Accordingly, Draper's action was "arbitrary and capricious" and
should have been reversed by the trial court.
6.

Draper's reversal of the earlier decision to allow

Owners to proceed with construction of their home on the upper
end of their Lot was predicated entirely on "public clamor"
rather than legally sufficient bases for such a decision. For
this

reason

too,

Draper's

decision

was

arbitrary

and

capricious and should have been overturned by the trial court.
7.

The trial court incorrectly held that the mutual

mistake of fact upon which the Draper Planning Commission
relied in allowing Owners to proceed with construction on
15

their Lot was a legally sufficient basis to overcome the lack
of jurisdiction for subsequent re-opening the issue, and that
this mistake prevented Owners from obtaining a vested right to
proceed with development and to assert that Draper was
equitably

estopped

from

halting

their

construction.

Persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions indicate that
where

a

land-owner

has

detrimentally

relied,

expended

substantial sums of money in improving property, and acted in
good faith on a mistaken zoning decision, that decision may
not be re-opened or reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

Draper lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or review
the April 20, 1995 decision by the Draper Planning
Commission after the expiration of the statutory
period for appeal of that decision.

On April 20, 1995 the Draper Planning Commission properly
considered all of the factors specified by the Draper Hillside
Ordinance and voted 5-1 to allow Owners to proceed with
building on the east end of the Lot.
Specifically, the minutes from that meeting reflect that
the request was approved because:
[T]here will be no significant harm caused by
building the home at the proposed location; the
proposed modification will result in a more
functional and improved plan; and there are no
surrounding property owners who have different
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expectations of the lot that would interfere with
going ahead with the building . . . .:
Ex. 10A at 5 7.4.
Under Section 6-1-4(B) of the Land Use and Development
Regulations of Draper City, Ex. 11, any appeal from a decision
of the planning commission "shall be filed in writing with the
City

Recorder

within

fourteen

Commission's Decision."2

(14) days of the

Planning

It is undisputed that no written

appeal of the April 20, 1995 decision of the Draper Planning
Commission to allow Owners to proceed with construction on
their Lot was filed within the appeals time allowed by Draper
statutes.

It is further undisputed that after the expiration

1

According to the Draper Hillside Ordinance, the three
factors that need to be considered when application is made
to building on slopes of 30% or more are:
(1) No significant harm will result;
(2) The proposed modification will result in a more
functional and improved plan; and
(3) The developer / builder agrees to comply with any
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning Commission
to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the
proposed modification.
Section 9-15-4(a) Draper City Hillside Ordinance. Ex. 7. The
planning commission's reference to expectations of surrounding
lot owners was therefore improper. In context, however, it is
clear that the April 20, 1995 decision was based on its
consideration of the factors set forth in the Hillside
Ordinance.
2

There was some testimony at trial that the correct time for
appeal under Draper's ordinances was actually thirty days. [R.
at 387]. Even if that longer time period were used, it is
undisputed that no written appeal of the Planning Commission's
decision to allow Owners to proceed was filed within 3 0 days
of the April 20, 1995 decision.
Id.
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of the appeals period for the April 20, 1995 decision, Owners
incurred

substantial

additional

expense

by

pouring

the

foundation for a home on the east end of the Lot.
Notwithstanding the lack of a timely written appeal, the
Draper Planning Commission reheard the issue of Owners1
construction on the east end of their Lot on June 8, 1996.
Owners appeared in person and through counsel at that meeting
and objected to Draper's lack of jurisdiction on the basis of
the lack of a timely written appeal. The planning commission
proceeded to reach the merits of the issue and again voted to
approve construction at the east (upper) end of their Lot. On
June 13, 1995 he Draper City Council met to consider, among
other matters, an "appeal" from the decision of the planning
commission on June 8, 1995 to allow Owners to proceed with the
construction of a home on the Lot.
their

counsel

jurisdiction.

appeared
The

and

city

Once again, Owners and

objected
council

to

again

the

lack

ignored

of
the

jurisdictional defect created by the lack of a timely appeal
and voted to reverse the planning commission's decision to
allow Owners' construction on the east end of their Lot.
The jurisdictional defect caused by the lack of timely
written appeal from the April 20, 1995 decision was briefed
and argued to the trial court during the judicial review of
Draper's actions. [R. at 37-38, 352-53]. The trial court
specifically found, however, that "[t]he Draper City Planning
18

Commission and Draper City Council had jurisdiction to hear
this matter." [R. at 225].
It has repeatedly been held that the policy of the law
must be to encourage finality of decisions.

Accordingly,

delayed appeals or reconsideration of matters previously ruled
upon are therefore not proper. See, e.g, Albretson v. Judd.
709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren,
669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983); In re Estate of Ratliff, 431 P.2d
571

(1967).

After the expiration of the appeals period

established by Draper's ordinances, Owners had an absolute
right to proceed with the development of their Lot.

The fact

that Owners relied to their detriment on the expiration of
this appeals period

in incurring

substantial

additional

construction expenses makes the jurisdictional issue even more
compelling.

The trial

court's ruling that

Draper had

jurisdiction to reconsider the April 20 decision after the
expiration of the appeals period appears to be based on its
finding that there had been Ma clear mistake of fact (i.e.,
the lack of neighboring property owners [sic] objections)."
[R. at 223-24]. Nowhere in the record nor in the Draper
statutes, is there any support for this ruling.

There is no

question that the Court found that any misstatement by Owners
on this point was made in good faith.

At the time of the

April 20, 1995 decision allowing them to proceed, Owners had
been informed by the developer of the subdivision that there
19

was no objection to them building at the upper end of their
lot and Owners so informed the Draper Planning Commission.
Certain property owners on the street above Owners1 lot
later asserted that this was incorrect and that they did have
objections to Owners' request.

There is no legal support,

however, for the trial court's decision to exempt these owners
from the requirement of filing a timely appeal under Draper's
statutes.

There is no requirement in either the Draper

Hillside Ordinance or Draper's Land Use and Development
Regulations, (or in the applicable provisions of the Utah
Code) that a municipality or planning commission give notice
to neighboring property owners of decisions.
commission meetings are public.

The planning

Items on the agenda are

publicly posted. That these non-contiguous "neighbors" did not
learn of the decision to allow Owners to proceed with
construction within the time allowed by Draper statutes for an
appeal is certainly not Owners' fault.

It does not justify

the trial court's decision to ignore the lack of jurisdiction
resulting from the absence of a timely written appeal.
The decisions of the Draper Planning Commission and City
Council taken after the expiration of the appeals period in
early May 1995 are void and illegal.

On that basis alone the

decision of the trial court to uphold the "Stop Work" Order
issued by Draper must be reversed.
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II.

The trial court erred in ruling that Owners had not
obtained a vested right to proceed with the
construction of a home on their Lot after they had
obtained a valid building permit and secured
approval from the Draper Planning Commission and
the time for all appeals from said decision had
expired.

Plaintiffs obtained a valid building permit to build a
home on the Lot on April 22, 1994. They obtained permission
from the Draper City Planning Commission to build on the east
end of the Lot on April 20, 1995. The appeal period for that
decision expired 14 days later.

By complying with Draper's

procedures and ordinances and obtaining the necessary permits
and authorizations, Plaintiffs acquired a "vested right" to
proceed with the development of their property.
in Western Land Equities Inct Vt City of Logan, 617 P.2d
388 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court explained need for a
rule with regard to "vested rights" in the development of real
property:
In our view the tests employed by most other
jurisdictions tend to subject landowners to undue
and even calamitous expense became of changing
city councils or zoning board? or their dilatory
action and to the
unpredictable results of
burdensome litigation. . . . The threat of denial
of a permit at a late stage of development makes a
developer vulnerable to shifting governmental
policies and tempts him to manipulate the process
by prematurely engaging in activities that would
establish the substantial reliance required to vest
his right to develop when inappropriate.
The economic waste that occurs when a project
is halted after substantial costs have been
incurred in its commencement is of not benefit
either to the public of to landowners. . . .
21

Governmental powers should be exercised in a manner
that is reasonable and, to the extent possible,
predictable.
• • • •

The above competing interests are best
accommodated in our view by adopting the rule that
an applicant is entitled to a building permit or
subdivision approval if his proposed development
meets the zoning requirements in existence at the
time of his application and if he proceeds with
reasonable
diligence,
absent
a
compelling,
countervailing public interest.
617 P.2d at 395-96 (emphasis added).
Exactly

as described

in the Western

Land

Equities

decision, Owners have been subjected to calamitous expense and
burdensome litigation and delay.
1994.

They purchased their Lot in

In 1995, relying in good faith on a properly issued

building permit and authorization from the Draper Planning
Commission

(which was not appealed)

they

expended

over

$100,000 in partially constructing a luxury home on that Lot.
They have now been stopped

for more than a year by a

capricious vot~. of the Draper City Council.
stands, there will be huge economic waste.

If this ruling
Owners will have

expended more than $1C0,000 to no useful end.
portion of the Lot is unbuildable.

The "lower"

The "half-constructed"

foundations are an eye-sore and, perhaps a danger to the
public. Under the "rule" established by Western Land Equities,
the Owners' right to proceed with their construction "vested"
when they obtained a valid building permit,

permission to

construct on the east portion of their lot, and they undertook
22

made by the Draper Planning Commission and City Council,
Effectively, Owners were precluded from pursuing the state and
federal constitutional claims set forth in their verified
complaint or from obtaining declaratory or injunctive relief
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seg. had the effect of
dismissing has filed a motion to dismiss, the sole purpose of
which

is to cause Plaintiffs' Verified

Complaint to be

"characterized as an appeal of the City Council's decision
with the proceedings going forward as contemplated by Utah
Code Annotated Section 10-9-1001." Reply Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, at 4.

The error In depriving Owners of

f.hese remedies, without any hearing on their merits, warrants
a reversal of the trial court's ruling on the Motion to
Dismiss.
Utah law with respect to motions to dismiss is well
established.

Such motions may be granted only under extremely

limited circumstances. A motion to dismiss "admits all of the
facts alleged" in the complaint or petition.

Russell v.

Standard Corp.e 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
Further, it has repeatedly been held that a complaint may not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of the claim."

Christensen v.
25

Lelis Automatic

Transmission SerVt, InCt, 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970).

Moreover,

in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the
complaint or petition in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and indulge in all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff or petitioner.

Russell v. Standard Corp., 898

P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); Mounteer v, Utah Power & Light Co,, 823
P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991).

It is not required that a complaint

spell out in detail all of the grounds upon which relief is
sought.

It is sufficient if the complaint or petition gives

the other party "fair notice" of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a "general indication" of the type of
litigation involved.

Utah Steel & Iron CQt Vt Bosch, 475 P.2d

1019 (Utah 1970).
As applied to the present case, the foregoing authorities
demonstrate the clear error of the trial court in dismissing
several of Owners1 claims for relief.

Unquestionably, Owners

had the statutory right to have the Draper City Council's
decision reviewed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The
remedy provided by that statute is only one of several bases
upon which Owners are entitled to seek judicial relief from
the actions of Draper.
A.

Owners have a direct right of action under Article

I § 22 Qf the Utah ConstitutionIn Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d. 622 (Utah
1990) the Utah Supreme Court expressly overturned prior case
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law to the contrary and held that Article I § 22 of the Utah
Constitution, which states that "[p]rivate property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation"
is "self-executing" and gave rise to a direct cause of action
for its violation. Id. at 635. The Colman decision also was
very clear in establishing the type of interference with
property rights that would give rise to a direct claim for a
"taking" under Article I § 22: "A 'taking' is any substantial
interference

with

private

property

which

destroys

or

materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or
destroyed. " X&. at 62 6.

For purposes of this motion to

dismiss, the Court must accept as true the allegations set
forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint.

Russell v. Standard

Corp.f 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St, Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). Those
allegations unquestionably establish a prima

facie

showing

that the value of Plaintiffs' property has been materially
lessened or that their right to its use and enjoyment has been
abridged

to

a

very

substantial

degree.

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have a right to assert a "takings" claim under the
Utah State Constitution.
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B.

Owners are entitled to geek Declaratory and/or
injunctive relief.

Section 10-9-1001 is not the only Utah statutory basis
for Owners1 challenge to Draper's decisions affecting their
Lot.

Pursuant to § 78-33-1 and 2 of the Utah Code Ann, the

trial court also had jurisdiction to hear and determine the
rights of the Plaintiffs as they have been affected by the
decisions of Draper City and its application of the Hillside
Ordinance.

Reported decisions of the Utah Supreme Court

recognize this use of the Declaratory Relief statutes.
Thurston

v.

Cache

County,

626

P.2d.

440

(Utah

E.g.

1981).

Plaintiffs have properly alleged this independent grounds for
the Court to review the actions of the Draper City Council.
See Verified Complaint, [R. at 11-12].
C.

Owners also have stated valid claims under the

Fifvh and Fourteenth Amendment? ts the United
States ConstitutionObviously, Owners' constitutional protection
uncompensated

taking

is not

limited

to

the

against

Utah

State

Constitution. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution also provide bases for challenging governmental
actions which deprive property owners of the use, enjoyment or
value of their property. See, e.g.,
First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church Y, L O S Angeles County/ 107 s ct. 2378 (1987).
Owners have thus also properly stated a cause of action for
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the taking of their federally protected constitutional rights.
£££_Verified Complaint, [R at 14-15].
D.

Owners have stated a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

Pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme

court in Moneii v. New York citv Department ol Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments are deemed to
be "persons" who can be sued under § 1983 when an action of the
local government causes a deprivation of a constitutionally
protected right. It has been held that an improper denial of
a building permit was sufficient to state a cause of action
under § 1983. See Bello v. Walker. 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir.),
cert, denied 488 U.S. 868 (1988); see also

Jacobs Visconsi &

Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)
(due process rights arise when plaintiffs have legitimate
expectation of a given outcome under applicable zoning laws).
In the present casef Owners have alleged that they had a
building permit, properly issued by Draper and that they had
also

received

permission

from

the Draper

City

Commission to build on the east end of their lot.

Planning
They have

further alleged that all appeal periods pertaining to this
decision had expired.

Under these circumstances, the Owners

had a legitimate expectation and constitutionally protected
right to the use and enjoyment of their property, which they
have been deprived of by the actions of Draper. Accordingly,
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they have stated a proper cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
The trial courtfs implicit dismissal of all Owners'
claims for relief (with the exception of their request for
judicial

review

under

§

10-9-1001)

was

improper

and

inconsistent with the legal requirements for the dismissal of
causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6).

For this reason too,

the trial court must be reversed.
V.

The trial court erred in ruling that Draper City
Council's reversal of the earlier decision of the
Draper Planning Commission was not arbitrary,
capricious or illegal in light of the Council's
failure to address the appropriate
factors
specified by the Draper City's Hillside Ordinance.

The trial court's review of the Draper City Council's
reversal of the permission given to Owners to proceed with
construction on their lot is to determine whether such a
decision was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001(3).

Although the trial court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the city council, the council's
decision is arbitrary and capricious if not made on the basis
of appropriate considerations. See Patterson v. Utah County
Board of Adjustmentr 893 P. 2d 602, 604-05 ("We must determine
on the basis of the evidence before the Board, whether a
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion.")

Moreover,

even if the considerations or reasons given for an action are
otherwise legally sufficient, a land use planning decision may
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still be arbitrary when the stated reasons lack sufficient
factual basis.

Davis County v. Clearfield Cityf 756 P.2d 704,

711 (Utah App. 1988).
The Draper Hillside Zoning Ordinance identifies three
specific factors that need to be considered when application
is made to building on slopes of 3 0% or more. These factors
are:
(1)
(2)
(3)

No significant harm will result;
The proposed modification will result in a more
functional and improved plan; and
The developer / builder agrees to comply with any
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning
Commission to mitigate any adverse effects which
may result from the proposed modification.

Section 9-15-4(a) Draper City Hillside Ordinance. Ex. 7
at Section 9-15-4.

The decisions of the Planning Commission

to allow Owners to proceed with construction on the east end
of their Lot were based on a consideration of these factors.
See Ex. 10A at 9-10.

In overturning those decisions, however,

the Draper City Council in its meeting of June 13, 1995,
failed to base its decision on any of these factors.

Instead,

the Council focused on concerns voiced by neighbors as to
potential effects upon their views, and the prices they had
paid for their lots.

Moreover, the City Council improperly

limited Plaintiffs' opportunity to be heard at the meeting
before making its decision. [R. at 297]. Because the stated
grounds for Draper City Council's decision were not proper
under the relevant statute, the decision was arbitrary and
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capricious and should have been overturned.

The trial court

should be reversed on this point.
VI.

The decision of the Draper City Council to reverse
the earlier decision of the Draper City Planning
Commission based on "public clamor" rather than a
consideration of the appropriate decision-making
factors.

In several reported decisions, the appellate courts of
Utah and other states have held that "public clamorM is not an
adequate basis for land use planning decisions.

In Davis

County v. Clearfield Cityf 756 P.2d 704, (Utah App. 1988), the
Utah Court of Appeals held that although "sentiments [of
neighboring landowners] may be weighed in a zoning decision,
they may not be the sole basis for granting or denying a given

permit." id.

at 712 quoting

city of Barnum Vt County of

Carlton, 386 N.W. 2d 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) . As the court
further explained:

[The] decision

appears to have been merely a

response to public opposition.
This is an
insufficient basis upon which to deny a conditional
use permit. A county must rely on facts, and not

mere emotion or local opinion, in making such a
decision*
Similarly, in Thurston v. Cache Countyf 626 P.2d 440, 445
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court also indicated that "the
consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion
for the issuance or denial [of] a conditional use permit."
It is readily apparent that, just as in the Davis County
case, the only real basis for Draper City Councils reversal
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of

the

decision

to

allow

Owners

to

proceed

with

the

construction on the east end of their lot was the objection of
neighboring

landowners who were concerned about possible

impact on the views from their lots or (even important) the
fact that Owners had paid less for their Lot that these
neighbors had and that it was somehow unfair for Owners to
obtain a good view without having paid for it! Ex. IOC at 3839.

None of the concerns expressed on the record at the June

13, 1995 meeting of the Draper City Council provides an
appropriate

basis

for

commission's

decision

the

to

construction on their Lot.

reversal

allow

Owners

of
to

the

planning

proceed

with

Instead, the decision clearly

appears to have been based on nothing more than opposition by
non-contiguous neighbors.

Such "public clamor" does not—as

a matter of law—provide a legally sufficient basis for zoning
decisions.

Draper's actions in stopping construction on

Owners' Lot were therefore arbitrary and capricious and should
have been reversed by the trial court.
VII. The trial court erred, in light of its express
finding that the Draper City Planning Commission
granted permission to Appellants to proceed with
construction on the basis of a mutual mistake of
fact (with no bad faith or deceit on the part of
Appellants) in determining that Draper had the
authority and right to reconsider the planning
commission's earlier action.
To a very substantial degree, the trial court's ruling in
this case that Draper could re-open the issue of Owners'
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construction on their Lot was based on its finding that the
planning commission's earlier decision had been based upon a
mutual mistake of fact —

the assumption by all parties that

the neighbors who had previously expressed concerns about
Owners1 plans for their Lot no longer objected.

Because it

found the decision of the Planning Commission to have been
based upon that mutual mistake, the trial court did not
enforce the jurisdictional

limit imposed by the appeals

deadline, did not find that Owners had a vested right to
proceed with development of their Lot and did not find that
Draper

was

equitably

estopped

from

halting

Owners'

construction on their Lot. [R. at 224-25]. There is no
question

that

permission

Owners

acted

in good

faith

in obtaining

from the planning commission to proceed with

construction.

Indeed, the trial court made a specific finding

that Owners had not acted in bad faith.

Thus, the question

raised by this case is the legal effect of land use decision
made on the basis of a good-faith, mutual mistake and relied
upon by Owners.
There is no law on this issue in the State of Utah.
Other

jurisdictions

have

issued

decisions

in

similar

circumstances that support the right of Owners to proceed with
construction

once they have relied

mistakenly granted zoning decision.

in good

faith on a

In Commonwealth v. Flynn

344 A.2d 720 (Comm. Ct. Pa. 1975), for example, the court
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ruled that a property owner's good faith reliance on a permit
issued by a municipality should afford him a vested right to
complete construction, even though the building permit was
issued in error. Significant factors that the court found to
support this decision were:

(1) the time to appeal the

decision to issue the permit had expired; (2) there was no
evidence that public health; safety or welfare would be
adversely affected by the use of the permit; (3) the owner
acted in good faith; and (4) the owner had spent a substantial
amount of unrecoverable funds that would be "wasted" in
detrimental reliance on the validity of the permit.

344 A.2d

at 724-25. Each of these factors is also found in the present
case.

similarly in Aranogian oil ecu V , City Qt Portsmouth, 612
A.2d 357 (N.H. 1992) the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled
that a zoning board could not reverse an earlier decision
allowing a property owner to proceed with renovations on its
property on the basis of an error by a zoning official in
reviewing the zoning application.

Once again in this case,

the Court found persuasive the fact that the owner had spent
approximately $45,000 in making renovations under the zoning
pe ;mit.
For precisely
decisions,

Owners

the same reasons set forth
should

be

allowed

to

in these

complete

the

construction of the home on their Lot. The time for appealing
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the planning commissions decision had run prior to Owners1
expenditure of funds to pour their foundation.

The Owners1

reliance on the planning commission decision was made in
complete good faith. No harm to public health or safety will
result from a decision to allow Owners to proceed.3

The

Owners1 good faith reliance on the earlier decision of the
planning commission has cost them approximately $50,000, which
amount will be completely wasted if the construction is
halted.

To avoid this inequitable result, the decision of the

trial court should be reversed and Owners should be allowed to
complete construction of their home.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing cases and authorities,
Owners respectfully request that this Court reverse and, as
appropriate, remand

this matter

for

further

proceedings

consistent with the established Utah precedent upon which they
rely.
Dated this

of September, 1996.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Mark E. Wilkey
"\
Gregory D. Phillips
j
Attorneys for Appellant?/
3

If construction is halted at its present state, however,
there may be a dangerous and unsightly condition in which a
partially completed foundation is left "sticking out" of the
top of the sloped lot.
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